Abstract. The security of the alleged RC4 stream cipher and some variants is investigated. Cryptanalytic algorithms are developed for a known plaintext attack where only a small segment of plaintext is assumed to be known. The analysis methods reveal intrinsic properties of alleged RC4 which are independent of the key scheduling and the key size. The complexity of one of the attacks is estimated to be less than the time of searching through the square root of all possible initial states. However, this still poses no threat to alleged RC4 in practical applications.
Introduction
Many key stream generators proposed in the literature consist of a number of possibly clocked linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) that are combined by a function with or without memory. LFSR-based generators are often hardware oriented and for a variety of them it is known how to achieve desired cryptographic properties 3]. For software implementation, a few key stream generators have been designed which are not based on shift registers. One of these generators, known as (alleged) RC4, has been publicized and described in 1]. RC4 is widely used in commercial products and standards (one example is the Secure Sockets Layer standard SSL 3.0).
RC4 takes an interesting design approach which is quite di erent from that of LFSR-based stream ciphers. This implies that many of the analysis methods known for such ciphers cannot be applied. The internal state of RC4 consists of a table of 2 n n-bit words and two n-bit pointers, where n is a parameter (for the nominal version, n = 8). The table varies slowly in time under the control of stream of RC4. These results are mainly of theoretical interest, as a large amount of output stream is necessary before this deviation can be detected. It remains an open problem whether these results can be used to cryptanalyze RC4.
The aim of this paper is to derive some cryptanalytic algorithms that nd the correct initial state of the RC4 stream cipher using only a small segment of output stream, and to give precise estimates for the complexity of the attacks where possible. The cryptanalytic algorithms in this paper exploit the combinatorial nature of RC4 and allow to nd the initial table, i.e., the state at time t = 0. Knowledge of this table enables to compute the complete output sequence without knowing the secret key.
If the rst portion of about 2 n output words are known, our basic algorithm allows to nd the initial table in a reduced search with complexity much lower than exhaustive search over all possible initial states. A careful analysis, which is con rmed by numerous experiments for di erent values of the word length n, shows that the complexity of the best attack is lower than the square root of all possible initial states. Our algorithms become infeasible for n > 5 and thus pose no threat to RC4 with n = 8 as used in practice. However, our attacks give new insight into the design principles of RC4 and the estimates of the complexity should give some realistic parameters for the security of RC4. Our results are intrinsic to the design principles of RC4 and are independent of the key scheduling and the size of the key. This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we give a description of RC4. In Sect. 3 we discuss an attack on a simpli ed version of RC4. Section 4 describes attacks on the full RC4, and Sect. 5 presents a possible optimization. We conclude in Sect. 6.
Description of RC4
We follow the description of RC4 as given in 1, 2]. RC4 is a family of algorithms indexed by a positive integer n (in practice n = 8). The internal state of RC4 at time t consists of a permutation table S t = (S t l]) 2 n ?1 l=0 of 2 n n-bit words and of two pointer n-bit words i t and j t . Thus the internal memory size is M = log(2 n !) + 2n, where log denotes logarithm to the base 2. The pointers i 0 and j 0 are initialized to zero. Let Z t denote the output n-bit word of RC4 at time t. Then the next-state and output functions of RC4 for every t 1 
The initial value of j is known. If we guess the values of v entries at the beginning of S, we know the value of the j-pointer for the rst v steps. In these steps we use (5) and (6) to determine new values of S. If we have not determined S v + 1] after v steps, we \lose" knowledge of the j-pointer. We discard the following Z t -values until we can use (7) to recover the value of j. Once j is recovered we can use (5) and (6) again, but we can also work backwards and use (8) to determine more entries of S. If v is too small, we will lose the value of j too fast and we will not be able to recover the table in this way.
Reduced Swap Frequency
In this version of RC4 we swap two entries after every s iterations. We start by applying the same algorithm as above, until the rst swap occurs. however, it is not possible to determine which element is responsible for the contradiction. A naive solution is to remove the three entries involved when we encounter a contradiction. However, in this way we will destroy more good values than we are able to produce, and we will end up with an empty table. For a good solution strategy it is important that the number of removed correct values is minimal. We have developed a number of heuristics to solve this problem; the details are omitted because of space restrictions. The resulting algorithm converges very fast.
If we increase the swap frequency 1=s towards 1, the algorithm needs a larger number of correctly guessed table entries before it can deduce the remainder of the table. Figure 1 shows the experimentally determined success probability as a function of the number of correctly guessed entries at the start, for swapping frequencies increasing from 1/128 to 1/2 (actual RC4 has swapping frequency 1). For a success ratio of 50% we need 40 correctly guessed entries at the start if the swapping frequency equals 1/128. If the swapping frequency increases to 1/2, we need about 240 correct entries. For a success ratio of 5%, we need 30, respectively 210 values. The complexity of this attack is proportional to the average number of trials required to guess the initial values correctly; e.g., there are approximately 2 315 possible ways to assign 40 8-bit values of the permutation table.
Attacking the Full RC4
This section presents cryptanalytic attacks on RC4 which allow to nd the initial table S = S 0 , without guessing values initially. Instead, values are only guessed when they are needed. First the attacks are described and their e ciency is analyzed. Then some special cases are discussed and experimental results are presented. 
Description
The idea of the algorithm may informally be described as follows. Although conditions i), ii) and iii) follow directly from the description of RC4, it is not obvious how to implement an e cient algorithm that exploits these restrictions and how to obtain practically meaningful estimates for the complexity of such an algorithm. We implemented this attack by means of a recursive function guess(t). In the most elementary version, at each parameter t one update following steps 1 to 4 is e ected. Thereby, three entries in the S table are a ected or suitably chosen, one entry determined by i t , one by j t and one by Z t , so that the update at time t can be carried out and so that conditions i) to iii) are satis ed. For a given output word sequence of length m the programs start by calling guess(1). In the recursive calls for increasing t most branches end up by contradictions. If one branch has reached depth t = size + 1 in the recursive algorithm, we compute backwards the (correct) actual state to state t = 0, in order to get the initial table S 0 . Experiments have shown that for the basic version of the attack as sketched, m = size = 2 n known output words are su cient to uniquely determine the correct state. Note that for RC4 with n-bit words, there are a total of 2 n ! di erent initial states. Thus, the required number of output words m can be estimated as the smallest integer such that 2 nm > 2 n !: Clearly, 2 n upper bounds m for any value of n. (For n = 8, m ' 211.)
We investigated several variants of the attack. In order to accelerate the attack in simulations, we pre-assigned the rst few words in the S and 8. Moreover note that for this variant the known output segment has to be slightly longer than for the basic attack.
There are even further re nements of the variant which we will not describe here. In another direction, computer experiments have lead to the following observation: suppose two initial tables S 0 and S 0 are given with the property that S 0 i] = S 0 i] for i = 1; 2; : : : ; k. Then for k su ciently large, suitable segments of the corresponding output sequences Z and Z of the RC4 algorithm are correlated. This correlation is illustrated in Fig. 2 . We have built this statistical property into our attack in order to make a preliminary test at a suitable time t whether a choice of values S 0 i], i = 1; 2; : : : ; t ? 1, is correct. It turned out that this in fact can lead to an acceleration of the attack but at the cost of a decreased success probability, as often a correct choice is excluded erroneously. 
E ciency of the Attack
The complexity of the attacks is measured in terms of the total number of assignments made for all entries in the initial table. It is necessary at this point to explain some further details of our search algorithm. The algorithm uses recursive function calls with the time variable t as parameter. Assume we are at some given time t, and let a t denote the number of entries in the initial table, which were assigned a value at time t.
It is checked whether S t?1 i t ] has been assigned a value:
(a) if it has, proceed to step 2.
(b) if it has not, then assign, one after one, the 2 n ? a t remaining values to 1=(2 n ?a) ) and f(a) = (2 n ?a)(1+e(a))+a=2 n .
Again we start with the known values c i (2 n ) and work downwards. The maximal number of assignments in our algorithm is given by complex(0) = c 1 (0). The results of the calculation are presented in Table 2 , where they are compared with some experimental results.
Special Streams
There are streams of output words for which our attack has an increased performance. Consider the above description of our algorithm. In step 2 of the algorithm we check whether Z t has a value which has previously been used in an assignment. If this is the case we can calculate an expected value for the entry S t j t ]. This either leads to a contradiction or it gives an assignment of an additional entry in the (unknown) table. If this is not the case we try and assign values to S t j t ] and proceed from there. Assume now that Z t equals Z t+1 . Then in our algorithm at time t + 1 the condition in step 2 is satis ed, since the value of Z t was used in an assignment in a previous step without reaching a contradiction, since we assume we are at time t + 1. Thus, the performance of the algorithm can be improved if many of the given words are equal. We have incorporated this in the above approximations, but we leave out the exact details. Table 1 lists the results of our tests for versions of RC4 with n = 4; 5. It follows that the performance of our algorithm for RC4 with n = 5 increases with more than a factor of two if the rst two words of the given stream are equal, and that the improvement is a factor of about 2 k?1 if the rst k words are equal.
Clearly, a similar phenomenon can be expected if the number of di erent values in the rst k words of the stream is greater than 1, but small. Table 1 . Approximations of the complexities of the attack on RC4, when the rst k words in the target stream are equal. 
Experimental Results
The rst interesting value for n is n = 4, where the number of entries in S 0 is out that the basic algorithm for our attack always nds the correct initial table in a few seconds, which represents a considerable improvement over exhaustive search. It is interesting to compare our result for n = 4 with a result in 2]: the method developed in 2] needs about 2 6n?8 output words of the RC4 stream cipher to detect a statistical deviation. This is about 2 16 output words for RC4 with n = 4, whereas we need 16 or 17 output words and about 2 20 computations to nd the correct initial table.
As measure of complexity we take the total number of calls of the function guess(t) that are necessary to nd the initial table. For n = 4 the average number of function calls turns out to be about 2 20 . For n = 5 the complexity of the attack is too high for the computing power we have available. Therefore, in simulations for n 5 we accelerate the programs by giving the correct values of the rst few entries of the S table. Experiments show that the amount of computing time can di er some orders of magnitude depending on the initial table to be found.
In Table 2 we give the results of our experiments for parameter values n = 4; : : : ; 8. Hereby k denotes the number of preassigned entries S 0 i], 1 i k.
Complexity means the average number of calls of the function guess(t) in the program with given parameter k in 1000 test cases. We should mention however, that the gures for the complexity are only rough estimates as the distribution for these numbers has a large variance. When the k preassigned entries have wrong values, the search terminates rather quickly with a contradiction in most cases. For k > 0 the total complexity is computed as the number N of all possible choices of the rst k entries multiplied by the average complexity. Note that N is computed as 2 n !=(2 n ? k)!. It can be seen that our test results for the cases n = 4 and 5 correspond well to the estimated complexity given in Sect. 4.2. Furthermore, for n = 5, k = 3 one can apply a program variant using the statistical property as described in Sect. 4.1. It turns out that the complexity in this case is about 2 30 , thus the total complexity is about 2 45 . However the algorithm often terminates unsuccessfully. The average success rate may be below 50%. For comparison, in the last column of Table 2 the magnitude of square root of 2 n ! is shown. It follows that the estimated total complexity is slightly below the square root of 2 n !.
We already mentioned that our search algorithm works better if the rst words of the output stream are equal. We close this section by listing the results for RC4 with n = 4 in Table 3 and leave it as an open question how large the improvement is for RC4 with n > 4 in these cases.
A Possible Improvement
In this section we explain a technique that can be used to improve the e ciency of the RC4 attack of Sect. 4.
Description
The basic principle of the technique is the following. The initial state of the permutation table S depends on the cipher key and is unknown. We assume that Table 3 . Complexities of the attack on RC4 with n = 4, when the rst k words in the target stream are equal, averaged over 1000 tests. all 2 n ! possibilities are equally likely, or that the a priori probability distribution of S 0 is uniform. We observe the generated values Z t and try to calculate an a posteriori probability distribution for S 0 . The method can easily be extended to deal with a non-uniform a priori probability distribution.
We represent our information about the value of j and the state of S by means of probability distributions. We de ne the functions f t as f t (a) = Pr(j t = a) and the array of functions g t as g t x](a) = Pr(S t x] = a): Since we know that j 0 = 0, the function f 0 is 1 at the origin, and zero elsewhere. Also, because S is a permutation at all times, we know that for all values of t and for a 2 0; 255]: P 2 n ?1 x=0 g t x](a) = 1: During the attack we observe the generated key stream Z t ; t = 0; 1; : : :, and we try to extract information about the value of j and the state of S after iteration t, by using (4) and Bayes' rule. The extracted information is manifest in the functions f t and g t x]: the closer these functions are to a delta-function, the less uncertainty we have about the values of j t and S t x].
In order to calculate the updated probability distributions, we have to take into account two e ects: observation of Z t , which gives us more information, or \narrows" the probability distributions, and the change of state for j and two elements of S, which tends to \ atten" the probability distributions. The derivation of the rules for updating the probability distributions is given in Appendix A. We assume that the di erent entries of S t are independent from each other, except that there cannot be two equal values because S t is a permutation.
This assumption is only an approximation.
Implementation
The algorithm reads one word of the key stream and calculates the values for f 1 and g 1 x]. The complexity is determined by the determination of g 1 : for each of the 2 n x-entries there are 2 n probabilities to calculate and every probability is the sum of (2 n ) 3 terms (cf. (24)). This gives a total complexity of 2 5n steps for each value Z t that is analyzed. In theory, we need less than 2 n values in order to determine the initial table uniquely.
Since the complexity of this algorithm is too high to test it on the full version of RC4, we tested it with a table that is partially lled in correctly, adapting the probability distributions accordingly. A partially lled table can result in a unique determination of j 1 , j 2 , . . . As long as j t is known, there is no \ attening e ect" and the Bayes method works as predicted. Experimental results suggest that it is di cult to get convergence when the uncertainty on j t grows. A possible explanation for the convergence problems is that the dependence of the di erent entries of S t on one another is too high to be neglected. If 160 entries or more of S 0 are given, the algorithm always succeeds in completing the table, the complexity being less than 2 30 . If 150 entries are given, the success ratio is 70%, and it is expected to drop very quickly from here. Figure 3 shows some experimental results for a simpli ed algorithm. The input of the algorithm consists of the values for k entries of S 0 . The algorithm performs the attack, until knowledge of j t is lost. The algorithm restarts and processes the key stream again with the updated information on S 0 until no new information is obtained anymore. Since j t is known, the complexity of the algorithm is reduced; it is now about k(2 n ? k) 3 . The gure shows how many Sect. 4 increases the e ciency. However, the problem of determining the rst k values remains. Since the latter attack also works without predetermined entries of S 0 , it could be used to generate a guess for these rst k values. Estimating the complexity of attacks based on combining the Bayes technique with the attack of Sect. 4 is a rather involved task. We leave it as an open problem to which extent this combination will improve the attacks on RC4.
Conclusions
We have demonstrated several cryptanalytic algorithms on the alleged RC4 stream cipher. The algorithms try to deduce the initial state in a known plaintext attack. First we demonstrated the importance of the swapping operation in RC4. Our results show that a less frequent use of the swapping operation enables stronger cryptanalytic attacks. The second algorithm has the best overall performance. It nds the correct initial state using only a small segment of known plaintext. The complexity of the attack was estimated by analytical calculations and veri ed by extensive testing. The complexity was approximated to be less than the time of searching through the square root of all possible initial states. We have also identi ed certain streams of words of RC4 for which the search algorithm has an increased performance. The third algorithm is based on probability theory. It involves no guessing, but it only works if a certain number of table entries is already known. Although our attacks are by far not practical for the speci ed word size of RC4, they give new intrinsic insight into the algorithm. It is our hope that our results will stimulate further research on RC4.
